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I. INTRODUCTION
On the cusp of the diminishing water project development era, the
Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law assumed a
daunting, heady, but essential task when it reviewed California's regulatory
framework on water rights law in the late 1970s.1 Presented the year after a
severe drought occurred throughout the state (1976-1977), the water use
efficiency recommendations and the ensuing legislative changes are arguably
more pertinent and relevant in today's age of population explosion and suburban
inland expansion than ever before. Recent geologic findings suggest that the
Twentieth century's water .supply was abnormally wet, making the boom in
growth through the lure of California's physical and economic climates more
precarious than previously assumed.2 Permanent water conservation and transfers
will be vital tools to sustain the world's fifth largest economy. However, transfers
hinge on certainty in delivery of appropriative allocations and in quantification of
riparian rights, an obvious yet arduous and politically contentious undertaking
still to be broached.3
The 1978 Final Report issued by the Commission evoked political
controversy when it created a theoretical framework for subsequent water use
efficiency legislation that attempted to assure security, certainty, and flexibility in
water rights.4 The Final Report sought to temper economic theory with
environmental and socially-reasonable considerations, enabling a creative,
market-based solution to a water rights system that previously privileged priority
and, arguably, inefficient "heirloom" rights allocation.5 The immediately enacted
nine, of twelve suggested, water use efficiency and conservation recom-
mendations focused on refining and procedurally facilitating a voluntary transfer
system, assuring property rights for the transferors, applying uniform forfeiture
laws, streamlining the administrative review process for water rights disputes,
and clarifying rights to wastewater.
6
1. See generally Brian E. Gray, The Modem Era in California Water Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 275
(1994) (discussing important features of California water transfer laws); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT:
THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 11 (1993) (addressing the political aspects of water
projects during the Carter administration); NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND
WATER: A HISTORY 365-388 (rev. ed. 2001) (exploring the complexity of the California water system).
2. Kirk Johnson & Dean E. Murphy, Drought Settles In, Lake Shrinks and West's Worries Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 2004, § 1, at 1.
3. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV.
671, 707 (1993).
4. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT (Dec.
1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
5. Harrison C. Dunning, Reflections on the Transfer of Water Rights, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 109, 110-11
(1977) (arguing that the most economically productive approach is not always so, as economic analysis can
exclude a set of indirect benefits and rights priority may have had a social purpose, in addition to an economic
one).
6. Id. at 114.
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Despite the immensity of these legal advances in encouraging recycling and
efficiency in water use, the Commission knew that they could not reach a
fundamental piece of the transfer conundrum and California water supply
problems more generally: institutional and political obstacles that presently
hinder the voluntary transfer system.7 This is not an indictment of the
recommendations; rather, the failure to transfer generated a more sustainable
solution to water problems by encouraging urban water conservation on a much
broader and more permanent scale throughout the state.8
The Commission exhibited courage in addressing the issues of water
conservation at all, knowing that there were substantial political and institutional
obstacles resistant to legislation that would subject any recommendations to
critique. Many of the impediments to transfer identified in the supporting
documents for the Final Report and those in the findings of California Water
Code section 1020 remain vexing variations on a theme of resistance to long-
term transfers and to changes from lower to higher-value uses in the market
approach. 9 A balanced set of legislative changes alone cannot achieve com-
prehensive solutions to such politically complex and controversial issues,
particularly when trying to shift a dominant paradigm of subsidy and hierarchy to
one of freer trade and efficiency. 10 Even the novel and inclusive CALFED
process, while paving better relationships between participants for future policy-
making, did not establish a comprehensive state water policy or assuage area of
origin concerns.' Ultimately, the players in the state's modem water game of
uncertain supply and growing population must humanely and fairly decide what
geographic areas and uses they prioritize for economic gain.
This article will trace the enduring legacy of the Commission's legal
prescience, and will synthesize perspectives on available future directions. Part II
describes the historical context for the water use efficiency recommendations,
laying a foundation for the reasoning behind each proposed legislative change.
Part EI delineates the full twelve recommendations, dividing them into those that
were eventually adopted, those that were not, and those that were partially
implemented. Adoption, in whole or part, does not always constitute de facto
"success" in a legal legacy, and Part IV categorizes those legislative changes (or
7. Thompson, supra note 3, at 677; Dunning, supra note 5, at 114, 116.
8. Mary Ann Dickinson, Cal. Urban Water Conservation Council, Water Conservation in California:
Insurance against Droughts and Blackouts, ACADEMIE DE L'EAU (2003), available at http://www.cuwcc.org/
Uploads/TechDocs/InsAgainstDroughtsBlackouts.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Water Conservation in Landscaping Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65591-65600 (West 1997).
9. ELLEN HANAK, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER IN
CALIFORNIA? THIRD-PARTY ISSUES AND THE WATER MARKET 12-15 (2003); Thompson, supra note 3, at 673-
76; CAL. WATER CODE § 1020 (West Supp. 2004).
10. HUNDLEY, supra note 1, at 543-64; Dunning, supra note 5, at 116.
11. Sarah Connick, The Use of Collaborative Processes in the Making of California Water Policy: The
San Francisco Estuary Project, the CALFED Bay-Delta Program, and the Sacramento Area Water Forum 166-
167 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Califomia, Berkeley) (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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lack thereof) into successes and failures, with particular focus on transfers and
ensuing urban water conservation measures. Part V elaborates on these urban
conservation measures, as well as other unanticipated impacts from the
recommendations in the state water policy arena and their continued relevance.
Finally, Part VI offers a synthesis of suggestions for additional steps, culled from
multiple sources, including the State Water Resources Control Board's Water
Transfers Workgroup ("WTW"), the Public Policy Institute of California
("PPIC"), and economic and legal scholars throughout the state.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND REASONS FOR THE FINAL
RECOMMENDATIONS: THEN AND Now
To understand the Final Report's recommendations' contribution to water
rights law and their evolution over the past two and a half decades, one must be
familiar with the context of the period in which they were generated. The enacted
recommendations reflect the larger movement toward incorporating and
balancing multiple interests through an economic efficiency approach to water
rights allocation. During the national sea change in environmental, legal, and
economic paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s, the California courts adopted an
equity and economic interest balancing approach to solving water rights disputes
that is still employed today. The Final Report was a state-level assessment of
water rights allocation that occurred parallel to the national phenomenon of
growth in state control over land use, also known as the "quiet revolution." 12 The
Commission's recommendations reflect an evolving concept of "waste" and
notions of use efficiency, moving from a "use it or lose it" standard to a more
expansive idea that includes environmental, social, and economic systems
perspectives.1 3 The Final Report sought to capture systems convergence through
regulatory, market and administrative reform approaches. The Commission's
efforts paved the way for our present water transfer system that guardedly
encourages a voluntary water market with substantial "no-injury" provisions and
third party protections through socially-tempered concepts of reasonable water
14
use.
12. See generally FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL (1971).
13. See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1979); CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West Supp. 2004).
14. Gray, supra note 1, at 273-83.
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In the environmental paradigm shift, after the air and water pollution
problems of the 1960s, Rachel Carson's 1962 book Silent Spring was a catalyst
for the 1970s environmental movement. Her accounts vividly conveyed the
message that environmental issues were not just about wild places but directly
affected people's daily lives and health.15 The ensuing rejuvenated and refocused
environmental movement created a political atmosphere for change, both locally
and nationally. Federal and state legislators capitalized on this momentum by
enacting the National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA") of 1970 and the
California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") of 1970. After the California
Supreme Court's 1972 holding in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors,
502 P.2d 1049 (1972), CEQA's environmental review requirements reached most
municipal land use decisions. Federal legislators subsequently adopted a cascade
of additional environmental protections, including the Clean Water Act, the
Clean Air Act, and the Endangered Species Act, creating a statutory toolbox that
reflected the greater societal environmental awakening. California legislators also
adopted the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act in 1972, severely curtailing additional
water projects by asserting that it was both reasonable and beneficial under
Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution to preserve certain rivers in
free-flow, for their wild and scenic value to California.
1 6
Simultaneously, in the legal paradigm shift, there was a movement
throughout the country towards a reasonable use in water law. 17 In 1928, the state
amended the California Constitution to prevent water waste by adding a
"reasonable beneficial" use requirement to all (riparian and appropriative) water
rights. 18 Until the 1960s, courts interpreted "reasonable beneficial" use as a
single, merged requirement. 19 But in the late 1960s and 1970s, California court
holdings distinguished the "reasonable" and "beneficial" use requirements and
interpreted the State Water Resources Control Board's ("SWRCB") authority to
enforce against wasteful uses through judicial action, creating a more expansive
standard for assessing use priority.2° In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District,
the court separated the notions of "reasonable" and "beneficial" uses in Article
15. HUNDLEY, supra note 1, at 309-11.
16. DEP'T OF WATER RES., THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE BULLETIN 160-98, app. 2A at 6
(1998) [hereinafter DWR BULLETIN 160-98].
17. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the Opening
of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 12-15 (2002) (using Alabama law as an
example of the shift in the interpretation of reasonable use); Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the
Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 294-96 (1990) (discussing historical water
rights); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 785-
86 (2001) (surveying the effects of population growth).
18. CLIFFORD T. LEE, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF WATER CONSERVATION IN CALIFORNIA 3-6 (Staff Paper No. 3, Aug. 1977).
19. Id. at 7.
20. See, e.g., id. at 32-34 (discussing California Water Code section 275, which requires that DWR and
the SWRCB enforce the reasonable and beneficial use requirements).
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X, Section 2 of the California Constitution. 2' The Joslin court affirmed the state's
power to assert an evolving definition of "beneficial" use, contingent on a
balancing of interests. Usufructuary in nature, and originally affirmed by the
priority system, water rights based on an obsolete use are tenuous at best, and
may lose their priority when competing with another, more economically and
societally "beneficial" use. Courts must make this factual determination on a
case-by-case, evidentiary basis.22 The court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. East Bay Municipal Utility District held that "use" in Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution must be reasonable and beneficial to society,
according to the context of the use (local custom, public interest, legislative and
constitutional policy of water conservation, etc.), variation of the situation, and
the concurrent discretion of both the courts and the SWRCB.23 With the growing
environmental movement, as well as the public trust doctrine revival through the
24seminal National Audubon holding, courts began to adopt an economic
balancing approach with multiple interests, acknowledging an evolution in the
concept of "waste." This new standard broadened the meaning of water rights
priority and altered their certainty.
In the economic paradigm shift, academic economists during the 1960s
promoted the theory of marginal cost pricing and efficiency, particularly in the
energy industry.25 This "commodity school" theory transferred to the water field
shortly thereafter, bringing with it three principles:
First, the economically most productive uses of water resources are the
best uses, provided adequate accounting is made for direct third party
impacts. Second, the market... will bring about the economically most
productive uses. ... Third, certainty in the definition of property rights
in water resources and a minimum of legal and institutional barriers to
the transferability of those rights are necessary if this market is to be
developed.26
Unlike the energy industry, the water industry was overwhelmingly public,
precluding a regulatory commission such as the Public Utilities Commission
27(PUC). Thus, water markets were a logical analog of marginal cost pricing. In
21. Id. at 7; Gray, supra note 1, at 253-59; Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967).
22. LEE, supra note 18, at 9.
23. 605 P.2d 1, 7-10 (Cal. 1980).
24. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). In addition to resurrecting the
public trust doctrine, evidence presented in the case provided a scientific and tangible manifestation of the
environmental effects of moving water from areas of origin. Id.
25. Interview with W. Michael Hanemann, Professor, Department of Agricultural Resource Economics,
University of California, Berkeley (May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Hanemann Interview] (notes on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
26. Dunning, supra note 5, at 109.
27. Hanemann Interview, supra note 25.
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fact, the Committee's staff director acknowledged the similarity of the energy
and water industries, dismissing less analogous pairings, such as land and water
markets, or coffee and water markets.28 Although the Committee recognized the
support for this paradigm shift and the emergence of water economics,
particularly in light of the dam construction shortage and the potential
environmental benefits, the staff director argued that the commodity school
should justify the priority given to economic uses, particularly in light of the dam
construction shortage and the potential environmental benefits. 29 Economic
productivity does not always account for environmental and social interests.
30
Concurrently, water supply development was slowing, if not ending, for
several reasons. First, many of the most profitable sites were already taken by the
late 1960s, and the cost-benefit analysis for new sites was harder to justify.31
Cost-benefit analyses themselves were starting to incorporate market-less and
non-excludable public goods, such as environmental amenities and clean air,
through revealed preference.32 Second, costs to build new projects were much
higher, with the expense of incorporating externalities (i.e. environmental laws
and associated remediation) and the lack of federal subsidy for large water
projects.33 The Carter administration simply refused to pay for additional federal
subsidies in project development.34 Third, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
effectively stopped development in California with its mandate to protect
California scenic river systems.35
With decelerated or abruptly halted water supply development and a growing
public perception of misallocation, not to mention actual climatic drought, the
state could improve water use efficiency by reducing demand and transferring
water to areas of more efficient use. The Final Report's recommendations reflect
a more holistic and comprehensive approach to water allocation, describing the
economic concept of marginal value, and the need to equalize uses/consumers
through transfers, without impairing the environment or third parties through
"substantial injury. 36 Admittedly strained, the market argument and the concept
of equalizing users were necessary components of a moderated commodity
school approach to water rights.37 This theoretical combination fuels the majority
of the recommendations in the market approach section, creating a guarded
transfer framework. The recommendations also acknowledge the power of the
28. Dunning, supra note 5, at 112-14.
29. Id. at 110.
30. Id. at 111.
31. Gray, supra note 1, at 259.
32. W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, 8 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 19, 21 (1994).
33. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 51; Gray, supra note 1, at 259.
34. REISNER, supra note 1, at 11; Gray, supra note 1, at 259-60.
35. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 51; Gray, supra note 1, at 256-60.
36. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 53.
37. Dunning, supra note 5, at 110.
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state with respect to determining water rights, and the tenuous, usufructuary
nature of the rights themselves. Even with such radical legal shifts to foster a
relatively free market approach in water rights, Professor Barton Thompson
argues that that the institutions to support these rights still do not fully exist.
38
The Commission realized such limited scope of legislative efficacy, but
nonetheless made their recommendations. 39 Like offering children their starter
toolboxes, the legislature could only stand back and hope that a transfer and more
efficient allocation structure would emerge from curious trifling. Ultimately,
augmented with new tools, a more enumerated water policy, and actual
incentives through a State Water Bank model, the teenage transfer system may be
more structurally sound.40
III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND STATUTORY
LANGUAGE IMPLEMENTATION
The Final Report recommendations reflect the Commission's attempt to
generate a comprehensive approach that improved water use efficiency by
increasing certainty, security, and flexibility in water rights. 4' The adoption and
amendment of those recommendations happened in three waves, roughly
following California's severe drought patterns in 1976-1977, and again in 1987-
1992.42 The first wave of adoption occurred in 1980, fueled by legislative
concern over 1977, the driest year on record.4 3 The second occurred
predominately in 1988 and 1991, spanning the five-year drought period." The
final wave occurred in 1999, the year after DWR's Bulletin 160-98, 45 with The
Water Rights Protection and Expedited Short-Term Water Transfer Act of
1999.46 Shown below, Table 1 illustrates the waves, as well as describes the
twelve recommendations by the Commission's reform approach and their
associated code sections.
38. Thompson, supra note 3, at 673-74.
39. Dunning, supra note 5, at 116.
40. HANAK, supra note 9, at 12-15.
41. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 57-71.
42. Department of Water Resources, Background: Droughts in California, at http://water
supplyconditions.water.ca.gov/background.cfm (last visited June 12, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. DWR BULLETIN 160-98, supra note 16.
46. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1014-1017, 1726-1728, 1732 (West Supp. 2004).
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TABLE 1: FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED AND AMENDED
Approach Recommendations Code Sections Years Adopted and
Adopted Amended
Regulatory 1. Local custom is only one factor in CAL. WATER CODE add. 1980
determining reasonable and beneficial use § 100.5 (West Supp.
under Article X, Section 2 of the California 2004)
Constitution.
Regulatory 2. SWRCB is granted cease and desist orders, CAL. WATER CODE add. 1980
as well as injunctive relief and civil penalties §§ 1825, 1831-1836,
over unauthorized diversions. 1845, 1850-1851 (West
Supp. 2004)
Market 3. The forfeiture doctrine is modified to CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 add. 1979,
retain the full amount of the right, and §§ 1011, 1241 (West § 1241 amen. 1980;
extended to a uniform forfeiture period of Supp. 2004) § 1011 amen. 1982,
five years. amen. 1996, amen.
1999
Market 4. It is possible to get a permit and license for Not adopted
appropriating salvage water; salvage water
gets priority over all other water rights in the
watercourse if no injury to users or instream
beneficial uses.
Market 5. The owner of a wastewater treatment plant CAL. WATER CODE add. 1980
gets the right to reclaimed water (unless there §§ 1210-1211 (West
is another agreement). Supp. 2004)
Market 6. No appropriation allowed for return flow CAL. WATER CODE add. 1980
water introduced to maintain instream § 1212 (West Supp.
beneficial use. 2004)
Market 7. Transfer is not waste and unreasonable use CAL. WATER CODE add. 1980
under Article X, Section 2, of the California § 1244 (West Supp.
Constitution, and does not constitute 2004)
forfeiture.
Market 8. Allow trial transfers of appropriative rights CAL. WATER CODE add. 1980; § 109
and long-term transfers if no "substantial §§ 109,1735-1740 amen. 1982;
injury" to other water users. (West Supp. 2004) §§ 1735-1740 amen.
1988, amen. 1991
Market 9. Adopt temporary transfer procedure for CAL. WATER CODE add. 1980, amen.
short-term transfers. §§ 1725-1732 (West 1988, amen. 1991,
Supp. 2004) amen. 1999
Market 10. Repeal district "surplus" restriction. Not repealed but later add. 1982
substantively repealed
through CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 380-387
Administrative 11. Repeal California Water Code sections Not repealed
1392 and 1629, restricting transfer to value of
the permit.
Administrative 12. Mandatory field investigation procedure CAL. WATER CODE add. 1980, amen.
for minor amounts of water and minor §§ 1345-1348, 1704.1- 1997
changes in use. 1704.4 (West Supp.
2004)
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Clearly, the Commission included more recommendations in the market
approach than in either of the others, thereby encouraging water conservation,
enabling transfers, and establishing allocation priority in reclaimed water to
ensure an economic interest in perpetuating reclamation.
A. The Regulatory Approach
Within the regulatory approach category, the Commission had two
recommendations: a change from the local custom priority 47 in determining
reasonable and beneficial use, and an increase in the SWRCB's enforcement
ability with unauthorized diversions.48 Both recommendations were adopted.49
Although determining reasonable and beneficial use was admittedly community
and region-specific under Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution, the
Commission's first recommendation gave less weight to the local custom
priority.50 The proposed code section allowed courts to adopt a more comprehensive
assessment approach by weighing local custom as only one factor in the
reasonable and beneficial use determination. 51 The California legislature adopted
the proposed code language verbatim from the Final Report in 1980.52 The
section has not been amended since.53
The Commission's second recommendation in the regulatory approach
category involved increasing the SWRCB' s power to reduce waste from unlawful
diversions. The code language granting the SWRCB the power to issue cease and
desist orders, as well as seek injunctive relief and civil penalties for continued
violations, was again adopted virtually verbatim from the Final Report in 1980
(except for some slight numbering changes). California Water Code section 1825
requires the state to take action to enforce existing permits to appropriate and
prevent unlawful diversions.54 Sections 1831 through 1836 grant the SWRCB the
power to issue a preliminary cease and desist order to a violating appropriator
and the ability to change the order after a properly noticed hearing (should the
notified party request it).55 These sections also permit the SWRCB to issue a final
47. Local custom priority is reflected in the Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation
District court's rule that an appropriator "is entitled to make a reasonable use of the water according to the
general custom of the locality, so long as the custom does not involve unnecessary waste." 45 P.2d 972, 997
(Cal. 1935).
48. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 57-59.
49. See id. at 73-79; CAL. WATER CODE § 100.5 (West Supp. 2004); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1825, 1831-
1836, 1845, 1850-1851 (West Supp. 2004).
50. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 71.
51. Id.
52. CAL. WATER CODE § 100.5 (West Supp. 2004).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1825.
55. Id. §§ 1831-1836.
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order and/or take other actions.56 Section 1845 allows the SWRCB to file an
injunction and seek civil penalties for failure to comply with a valid cease and
desist order.57 Finally, sections 1850 and 1851 reflects the language (but not the
numbering) of the Final Report, retaining the right for private action, but
mandating that a final cease and desist order cannot be raised in other
administrative proceedings.58
B. The Market Approach-Chaptering Successes
If volume is any indication, the Commission focused most intensively on the
market approach category to increase water use efficiency.59 Nine of the twelve
recommendations in the Final Report created market-based incentives for more
economic and use efficiency.60 Of the nine, three (and their ensuing legislative
language) were excluded in 1980. The rest were adopted, with some amendment
and subsequent overhaul throughout the last two and a half decades, resulting in
the framing and refining of both the transfer market and ensuing conservation
legislation.
To encourage appropriators to engage in water conservation, and to address
their concern about the forfeiture doctrine and conservation as a beneficial use,
the Commission recommended a change to the forfeiture doctrine and the
imposition of a uniform five-year forfeiture period.61 Both of these recom-
mendations were added verbatim from the Final Report.62 Adopted in 1979, the
language in section 1011 stated that water use reduction from conservation
(through temporary fallowing, etc.) would not forfeit the right to the
appropriator's original volume, provided that the appropriator filed with the
SWRCB. 63 And, in 1982, the code section was amended, adding a sub-section to
allow for the transfer of the conserved water, should it comply with governing
state law.64 In 1980, section 1241 was amended to reflect the Commission's
recommended language changes, including substituting "use beneficially" instead
of "beneficially use," instating a five-year forfeiture period instead of three years,
and an automatic reversion clause to public water upon the lapse of the five-year
period. The final incarnation of transfer assurance occurred in 1999, with The
Water Rights Protection and Expedited Short-Term Water Transfer Act of 1999,
56. Id. The mandamus clause in section 1840 was initially adopted in 1980, then repealed in 1996. See
id. § 1840.
57. Id. § 1845.
58. Id. §§ 1850-1851.
59. See Table 1, supra text following note 46.
60. More economic efficiency is created by lower to higher value water uses through voluntary transfers.
More use efficiency comes from conservation measures.
61. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 71.
62. Id. at 80-82.
63. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West Supp. 2004); FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 80-81.
64. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011.
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which added sections 1014 through 1017, 1726 and 1727 and amended section
1728. Sections 1014 through 1017 state that transferring water does not forfeit a
right or constitute waste, and the beneficial use of transfer goes to the
transferor.65 Sections 1726 and 1727 establish the process for a temporary change
permit, subject to the no-injury rule.66
With the death of the water project development era, water districts sought to
generate supply through water recycling. But before the Commission's
recommendations on reclaimed water, the water right could go to either the water
supplier or the treatment plant operator. Adopted verbatim in 1980 from the Final
Report, but with different code numbers, sections 1210 and 1211 reward the
treatment plant owner for investment in treatment equipment by granting the
owner the right to the wastewater.67 The treatment plant owner may also apply
for a change in point of use for this reclaimed water, permitting the owner to sell
or distribute the "new" water.68 Section 1212 protects the return flow for
beneficial in-stream use, preventing other users from appropriating the recycled
wastewater if the owner of the treatment plant introduced it to enhance in-stream
uses.6 9 The SWRCB cannot grant permits for this water.7°
To assuage concerns that transferring water would jeopardize the holder's
appropriative rights to the water through claims of non-beneficial use (i.e., waste
or forfeiture), the Commission recommended an affirmative declaration of
existing law.7 1 Section 1244 was added in 1980, verbatim from the Final Report,
guaranteeing that the "sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of water or water rights,
in itself, shall not constitute evidence of waste or unreasonable use, unreasonable
method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion and shall not affect any
determination of forfeiture applicable to water appropriated pursuant to the Water
Commission Act or this code or water appropriated prior to December 19,
1914. ",72 This language purportedly established security in the original rights
holder, creating an incentive to voluntarily transfer water.
But in order to execute a voluntary transfer, the rights holder needs flexibility
both in the right, and in the terms of its transfer. In the decade following the
release of the Final Report, the Commission's recommendations with respect to
water transfer flexibility were adopted in their entirety. The recommendations
distinguished temporary transfers from trial and long-term transfers, all of which
were encouraged through the legislation. Realizing that some rights holders
sought short-term transfers through crop fallowing, while others decided to retire
65. Id. §§ 1014-1017.
66. Id. §§ 1726-1727.
67. Id. §§ 1210-1211; FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 85-86.
68. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1210-1211 (West Supp. 2004).
69. Id. § 1212.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 1244; FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 87.
72. CAL. WATER CODE § 1244 (West Supp. 2004).
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a field in a long-term transfer, the Commission created a transfer system with
three categories: temporary, trial, and long-term.73 As adopted in 1980, section
109, declared that the State supports voluntary transfers and defined property
rights to further improve use efficiency.74 This code section was amended in
1982 to delegate responsibility to the SWRCB and to DWR for technical
assistance on water conservation measures. 75 An extension of the Commission's
transfer-enabling intent, section 475, was adopted in 1986 and enumerated the
legislative findings to support voluntary water transfers, asserting that they are in
the public interest.76
The temporary transfers were facilitated by sections 1725 through 1730 in
1980, by providing a procedural structure. They were subsequently amended in
1988, 1991, and 1999, with relatively few substantive changes.77 These sections
allow a temporary change in the point of diversion caused by a transfer if the
transfer is equivalent to the amount of water that would have otherwise
"consumptively" been used, and would not injure other users or the
environment. 78 "Temporary change" is defined as "any change of point of
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use involving a transfer or exchange of
water or water rights for a period of one year or less" '79 and are exempt from
CEQA review.80 This exemption is an integral element in the code, expediting
temporary transfers when others are subject to lengthy environmental review
processes. While short-term and long-term transfers must meet the "no-injury"
rule, 8' exemption from environmental review potentially makes the transfer more
economically viable so that transaction costs do not exceed the value of the
transfer. A legal balm for concerned transferors, former section 1740 (adopted in
1980 and later repealed in 1988 to become section 1731) assures the transferor
that at the end of the "temporary change" period, all rights revert to the original
holder.82 Section 1732 was adopted in 1988, then repealed in 1999, preventing
the transferor from starting to use or increasing their use of groundwater to
replace the transferred surface water.
83
73. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 88-91.
74. CAL. WATER CODE § 109 (West Supp. 2004).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 475.
77. Id. §§ 1725-1730.
78. Id. §1725.
79. Id. §1728.
80. Id. §1729.
81. See WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, WATER TRANSFER ISSUES IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL REPORT TO
THE CALIFORNIA SWRCB app. 3 (June 2002), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/Programs/Water/Transfers/
adobe-pdf/Final-Report%20_Water._Transfer_-Group.pdf (last visited July 24, 2004) [hereinafter WTW FINAL
REPORT] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the "no-injury" rule's definitions and
interpretations).
82. CAL. WATER CODE § 1731 (West Supp. 2004).
83. Id. § 1732.
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Finally, sections 1735 through 1740, adopted in 1980 and amended in 1988
and 1991, enabled trial and long-term transfers.84 The code sections permit long-
term transfers (exceeding a year in duration), and allow any water right to be
transferable, provided that there is a SWRCB hearing in which the petitioner can
show that the change in use would not result in substantial injury to legal users or
fish, wildlife and other instream beneficial uses. 85 It is unclear if this no
"substantial injury" provision is substantively the same as the "no-injury" rule in
temporary and trial transfers.86 The 1991 amendment gave the Department of
Fish and Game review and recommendation power in section 1736, exceeding
the simple notice requirement in the temporary transfers language.
87
C. The Market Approach-Chaptering Disappointments
According to Kimberly Felix, "[i]n the year following the release of the Final
Report, Assemblymember William J. Filante authored and introduced Assembly
Bill 1147, a bill containing nearly identical language to that of the Commission's
proposed legislation," with ten of the twelve recommendations.88 The fourth
recommendation, the salvage water provision, enabled a salvager to obtain a
permit and license for appropriating salvage water and gave priority to this water
over all other water rights in the watercourse if it did not injure other legal users,
fish, wildlife, or in-stream beneficial uses. 89 However, "due to concerns about
environmental costs and quality," the recommendation was cut on the floor.90
In the Commission's staff background document on the conservation issues
to consider in the Final Report, Clifford Lee distinguishes salvage water, return
flow, and waste and seepage water classifications. 91 Lee defines salvage waters
as "parts of a particular stream or other water supply that have been unavailable,
as far as any beneficial use is concerned, to any of the established users, but are
made available by artificial means," and expresses concern that they may affect
other legal users.92 He argues for salvage legislation that promotes water
conservation through its clarity on priority and permitting.93 The fear of forfeiture
and conflicting SWRCB permit precedent would otherwise dissuade con-servation.9 4
84. Id. §§ 1735-1740.
85. Id.
86. WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at app. 3.
87. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1726, 1736 (West Supp. 2004).
88. Kimberly A. Felix, Improving Efficiency in Water Use: An Overview of the Recommendations of the
Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, 36 McGEORGE L. REV. 165, 173 (2005).
89. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 71.
90. Felix, supra note 88, at 174.
91. LEE, supra note 18, at 38.
92. LEE, supra note 18, at 38 (citing 2 HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 565 (1975)).
93. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 60-61; LEE, supra note 18, at47.
94. LEE, supra note 18, at 61.
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Lee was especially concerned with confusion over whether municipalities' wastewater
was considered salvage, return flow, or seepage, thus affecting their decision to invest
in recycling technology.95 The legislature did not share this concern in 1980, nor
did it agree that it should establish a right in salvaged water superior to other
users' rights, subject to the no injury rule.96
The legislature also did not agree to fair market value for transferred
appropriative rights. The Commission sought to entirely repeal sections 1392 and
1629, which limit the value of transferred appropriative rights to the amount paid
for the permit. While the Commission feared that this would preclude fair market
valuation and maintain a disincentive to transfer, both sections remain on the
books.
Like the other two recommendations, the legislature did not repeal the
surplus language in individual district formation acts.97 The language restricted
districts to the sale of surplus water if they were selling outside of the district
boundaries.98 Yet, in 1982, the legislature chaptered sections 380 through 387.
These code sections grant deference to local or regional agencies' discretion over
water management in their regions, in furtherance of the policy set forth in
Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution and Water Code section 109,
and explicitly supercede the individual district formation statutes on the sale of
surplus.99 "Local agency" is defined as "any public agency other than a state
agency,"' ° and the statutes do not apply to federal agencies.' 0 ' They enable the
agencies to transfer water outside of the agency, for up to seven years, contingent
on a SWRCB finding of no injury, and consent from the agency within whose
boundaries the transferee is located. 0 2 As much as these sections effectively
lifted export restrictions for the local agencies, they simultaneously created an
ambiguity about who (the institution, the individual rights holders within the
institution, etc.) can transfer the surplus. This may be a present barrier to
transfer.1
03
95. Id.
96. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 61.
97. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 22259 (West 1984) (limiting irrigation districts to sale of only
surplus, both within and without the district); id. § 22261 (West 1984) (preventing irrigation districts from
selling their water rights); id. § 31023 (West 1984) (limiting county water districts to sale of surplus to those
outside the district (municipalities, public agencies or consumers)); id. § 35427 (West 1984) (preventing water
districts from selling their water rights); id. § 55336 (West 1966) (limiting county waterworks to sale of surplus
to those outside the district); id. § 71612 (West 2004) (limiting municipal water districts to sale of surplus,
within and without the district). See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 94 (suggesting that the same kind of
surplus language be removed from the special district acts).
98. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 68.
99. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 380-387 (West Supp. 2004).
100. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65930 (West 1997).
101. CAL. WATER CODE § 380(d) (West Supp. 2004).
102. Id. §§ 380-387.
103. Thompson, supra note 3, at 726.
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Curiously, one of the statutes in the Commission's recommendations appears
to have been modified to reflect part of the Final Report language. Section
35425, which applies to water districts and does not eliminate the surplus
restriction on sale, adds "for use either within or without the district" language
recommended in the Final Report. 1°4 The legislative history does not note the
addition, merely stating that the statute was added in 1951.105
D. The Administrative Approach
Like the regulatory approach, the administrative approach contained only
two recommendations. The first recommended certifying small, unauthorized
diversions with non-discretionary permitting, much like the SWRCB's approach
to stock pond permitting.
The second changed the SWRCB's dispute investigation procedures. DWR
was similarly empowered to investigate minor protested applications and minor
protested petitions for change, using the threat of investigation to persuade
private parties to settle disputes privately. Under sections 1345 through 1348,
adopted in 1980, DWR conducts field investigations of protested "minor
applications." 10 6 Section 1345 was amended in 1997 to change the means of
notice and time period for contested applications.10 7 Sections 1346 and 1347 were
simultaneously repealed and reinstated in the same year. They relate to the field
investigation in section 1345, mandating that parties submit supporting
information on the contested applications, and empowering DWR to issue a
decision based on the investigation and the hearing.
10 8
Also added in 1980, sections 1704.1 through 1704.4 mirror the procedures
for the minor application, but apply them to minor protested petitions for
change.0 9 Like the protested minor applications, section 1704.1 was amended in
1997 to change the notice requirements for the DWR field investigation of all
minor protested petitions for change. ° Sections 1704.2 and 1704.3 were
repealed and reinstated in 1997, permitting DWR to request supporting
information on the contested applications, and empowering DWR to issue an
order regarding water rights.111
104. CAL. WATER CODE § 35425 (West 1984).
105. Id.
106. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1345-1348 (West Supp. 2004).
107. Id. § 1345.
108. Id. §§ 1346-1347.
109. Id. §§ 1704.1-1704.4.
110. Id. § 1704.1.
111. Id. §§ 1704.2-1704.3.
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IV. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES: IMPLICATIONS OF
IMPLEMENTATION, OR LACK-THEREOF
The successes and failures of the Commission's recommendations focus
predominately on the legacy of the transfer language, with passing discussion of
the other efficiency recommendations. Hundley attributes any failures of the
Commission's recommendations to the then-Governor's subsequent actions, yet
the ensuing transfer and water policy problems were the product of a conflation
of factors, most of which could not be altered through legislation." 2
A. Successes
Success can be defined in several ways, but from a policy and practical
perspective the de facto effect carries the most credence. Using the
Commission's staff director's own standard, "[a] knowledge of the particulars of
various kinds of transfers as well as an understanding of why attempted transfers
sometimes fail is necessary to make a judgment of the significance of water
rights transfer law.'13 If success is defined as innovation through establishing the
procedural and bureaucratic infrastructure to support the transfer process, and
creating of an affirmative right that allows a transferor to transfer with legal
protection upon the termination of the transfer, then the recommendations have
succeeded. In addition, if success is defined by an expanding progression and
code development from the initial set of recommendations (including wheeling
statutes, amendments to the original code sections, etc.), then the re-
commendations have succeeded. However, if success is defined by the sheer
volume of transferred water, by the quantity of transfers from lower to higher
uses, and by variation in duration,.then the recommendations have failed. Yet, the
Commission deserves a more nuanced judgment of success than sheer volumetric
measure. The transfer framework should be judged by whether the water is
reaching society's prioritized users, begging the larger question of how and for
whom society sets its priorities.
1. Transferring Surplus; Clarifying and Creating Security in Rights
Irrefutably, the Commission's recommendations have had a profound, yet
delayed, effect on California water supply and use efficiency. The code adoption
was a success in the sense of enactment. As previously mentioned, only two
years after the Final Report's release, nine of the twelve recommendations were
chaptered virtually, if not entirely, verbatim. Six of the nine recommendations in
the market approach were adopted. The Commission launched the framework
that has since been amended and refined, but created the legislative backbone for
112. HUNDLEY, supra note 1, at 561.
113. Dunning, supra note 5, at 117.
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transfers in California. Agricultural users prefer transfers to pricing, given the
risk allocation with market-clearing prices and pricing efficiency versus equity
concerns. 14 Gray argues that their voluntary nature is another Commission
success with the transfer system. 
1 5
The code sections making a uniform forfeiture period and affirmative
statements about transferred water ensured the flexibility of the right, as
evidenced by the fact that some transfers started as early as the 1980s. 116 Short-
term transfers constitute a majority of the transferred volume, particularly post-
1991 State Water Bank, and occur largely between users in the same water
institution. 1 7 The Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) of 1992
follows sections 380 through 387 of the California Water Code and reflects the
substantive spirit, if not the exact surplus language, from the Final Report.
18
According to Gray, when assessing California's current water rights era, the two
most important aspects of water transfer law are the ability to transfer surplus"19
and conserved water, 120 and the fact that transferor's rights to the transferred
water are legally protected. 12 1 Both of these legal concepts originated in the Final
Report. The "no forfeiture if conservation clause"'22 allows individuals to retain
their rights, despite land fallowing, making conservation a reasonable and
beneficial use in California. This is a monumental, yet simple element of a wiser
water use policy. Without it, the appropriative system, founded on an
anthropocentric conservation ethos principle of use that promotes waste, was an
impediment to conservation.1
3
Establishing rights in reclaimed water is a subtle, but remarkably effective
incentive to invest in what has now become a means to combat "waste" in urban
areas. The rights in reclaimed wastewater rewards districts for their more
environmentally-friendly recycling practices, which have become an integral
element of urban water supply.1 24 Reclamation produces a significant volume of
recovered water, with the potential for more, through developing technology. 125 It
114. Thompson, supra note 3, at 717-18.
115. Gray, supra note 1, at 276.
116. Thompson, supra note 3, at 716.
117. HANAK, supra note 9, at 14; Thompson, supra note 3, at 713-14.
118. Gray, supra note 1, at 285-91. However, the CVPIA is more expansive with the individual's ability
to transfer, regardless of the agency veto power (unlike California).
119. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 380-387 (West Supp. 2004).
120. Id. § 1011.
121. Gray, supra note 1, at 275.
122. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West Supp. 2004).
123. George Perkins Marsh is first ascribed with generating the anthropocentric conservation ethos,
which reserves natural resources for present and future economic, social and aesthetic use under the Pinchot
model of cyclical use and replacement. Marsh also described the dangers of overusing forests to the detriment
of water supply. GEORGE P. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (1864); see SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K.
FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY 70 (2d ed. 1980).
124. See Dickinson, supra note 8.
125. Id. at 1.
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also shows transfer-resistant users that the urban areas are utilizing their resource
wisely, and additional water purchases are legitimately needed.
The administrative streamlining reforms in the SWRCB processes were
essential elements of the transfer process. Without determined rights, there can
be no transfers, and without timely processing, the parties may miss the window
in which to complete the transaction, especially the short-term ones. There are
understandable concerns about the environmental impacts of streamlining a
permitting process, but the Commission made excellent suggestions balancing
both environmental and social concerns. However, the potential to further
streamline the review process is limited because overzealous streamlining may
compromise protection for other legal users, fish, wildlife, and in-stream uses.
126
The cumulative effects of multiple small short-term transfers can be just as
devastating as one high-volume short-term transfer.
2. The Legislative Road Not Taken
So far, the successful recommendations have been affirmative, but the
legislature's refusal to repeal sections 1392 and 1629 seem to have had very little
impact on the transfer market. Transfer volume in the agricultural community, or
from agricultural users to the environment appears to be more affected by the
price disparity for different kinds of users and by political and area of origin
concerns than the code sections.1 27 Even if they had been repealed and a profit
permitted, water sellers could conceivably stall the transfer market by waiting for
a seller's market.
The Commission wisely left the reasonable and beneficial use determinations
to the courts, to be employed on a case-by-case basis. The court in California
Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board followed the Final Report, in
which the majority held that reasonable and beneficial use, as ambiguously
described in Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution, does not include
leaving in-stream flow for environmental purposes. 128 Justice Reynoso strongly
dissented, and the legislature honored that dissent in 1991 with the adoption of
California Water Code section 1707. Section 1707 states that if prior
appropriation is perfected, and the transfer is for recreation, the SWRCB can
approve whether or not the proposed use involves a diversion of water. 129 In
principle, it would be feasible to find someone with a perfected right to
appropriate water, and then purchase the right to leave the water in the stream.
126. Thompson, supra note 3, at 706-07.
127. See HANAK, supra note 9, at 18-20.
128. 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1979).
129. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West Supp. 2004).
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B. Failures
As much as establishing a water market may be considered a success, there
are still social and political stumbling blocks that plague the transfer process
today. The Commission's market is subject to common market critiques. Social
and environmental protections through cautious no-injury provisions hamper a
free transfer market. Despite the early enabling legislation in 1980, transfers did
not take off until after another drought, motivating the generation of the State
Water Bank in 1991.130 The current volume of post-1991 transferred water
constitutes only three percent of the water available in California.' 31 The majority
of transfers are short-term, either from one agricultural water user to another or
between an agricultural user and the environment (to.USBR, etc.). 132 There are
very few transfers from irrigation to urban uses, but those that do occur tend to be
long-term. 33 Although the streamlining recommendations have reduced the
permitting timeline by using non-discretionary permits, short-term or low-
volume transfers still suffer from relatively high transaction costs. 134 And yet, the
no-injury requirements are necessary to balance competing environmental and
economic interests. Long-term transfers are more immune to transaction costs
through economies of scale. 1
35
1. The Institutional Conundrum and Legislative "Might Have Beens"
The Final Report never addressed institutional bias or reached the internal
workings of California water institutions, in part because internal institutional
power is difficult to reach through state legislation. Institutions can enable or
inhibit the transfer process, assuming more of a role than is reflected in the
governing water law. 136 According to Thompson, "[1local institutions-have often
created internal markets that enable their members to transfer water among
themselves more readily than traditional state transfer procedures would permit.
Yet, institutions have also served as a significant barrier to external transfers of
water."'137 Transfers between different water project contractors are effectively
excluded.
138
130. See HANAK, supra note 9, at 12-13.
131. Id. at 14.
132. Id. at 18-20.
133. See id. at 22-24 (stating that according to records there were "15 approved long-term transfers and
14 permanent transfers of surface water rights or entitlements from 1985 to 2002").
134. The costs manifest in time and the no-injury findings reports. Thompson, supra note 3, at 704;
WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 13.
135. Thompson, supra note 3, at 703.
136. Id. at 673.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 719.
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Thompson posits that there are three institutional reasons for opposition to
interregional transfer: first, unclear property rights lead to unclear beneficiaries
(i.e., does the individual or the institution hold the water right) and possible rent-
seeking; 39 second, transfers generate a risk of third-party effects for other rights
holders within the institution; 40 and third, managers or district boards have
internal political concerns.1 41 There are legislative solutions for two of the three
barriers. Property rights clarification and mitigation for institutional third-party
effects can be improved through amendments to the district formation acts. The
internal political concerns are more difficult to reach, due to social dynamics and
the sway of an informed consumer group. The Commission might have done so
with a recommendation to limit the institutions' ability to veto transfer 142 and
through transfer empowerment to individual institution members, also known as
"member transfer legislation."'' 43
However, the districts themselves might have lobbied against such an act, for
Thompson argues that water institutions can have as much of an effect on state
water policy as changes to water rights law. 44 Getches would agree, except that
Getches views institutions as particularly short-sighted, asserting that any
comprehensive state water policy must come from all players and strategies.
45
Thompson argues that there is very little that can be achieved through changes to
the water rights law, and the transfer statutes in particular. Specifically,
Thompson states:
The California experience, however, also suggests the limited relief that
legislative tinkering with the statutory transfer process can provide-
particularly in increasing local flexibility among small users. A survey of
approximately 500 California water users in the early 1980s revealed that
over a quarter were potentially interested in selling some or all of their
water. Yet the 1982 legislation yielded only about two transfer
applications per year, virtually all of which involved large transfers by
institutions or sizable commercial interests; only one application entailed
a small transfer between individual water users.
146
Hundley makes the same argument when he states that legislatures simply
have not been able to solve the water supply problem, insinuating that the Final
Report's recommendations had less than the anticipated effect, and calls for a
139. Id. at 730.
140. Id. at 731.
141. Id. at 731.
142. See id. at 673; Gray, supra note 1, at 280-81.
143. Thompson, supra note 3, at 745.
144. Id. at 675.
145. See David H. Getches, Essays from Askhabad, to Wellton-Mohawk, to Los Angeles: The Drought in
Water Policy, 64 U. CoL. L. REv. 523, 548-53 (1993).
146. Thompson, supra note 3, at 706.
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"coordinating agency authorized to take charge.' 4 7 Hundley's agency would
establish a mechanism to address the problems through several different legal
and social arms, as "[t]he issue has thus far proven beyond the capability of
legislatures, is not suited to resolution by the courts, and is too complex (and
important) to be left to the vicissitudes of the initiative process. '148 Given its
existing oversight authority, its multiple arms and its familiarity with institutions
throughout the state, the SWRCB would logically be the agency to assume a
greater review and enforcement role.
Admittedly, the Commission's efficacy was handicapped by the means
available to change water policy. However, despite the confinement to the arena
of water rights law, the Commission succeeded in creating a theoretical, market-
based approach to effect the changes that reflect new concepts of efficiency in
water use (from Joslin, National Audubon, the Racanelli decisions, etc.).
2. Persistent Ag to Urban Transfer Fears
These changes attempted to eradicate the effects of the dynastic priority
system in water, but users continue to cling to heirloom rights as they resist long-
term, interregional transfers. Despite the de jure protection given through the
Commission's adopted, and subsequently amended, recommendations to ensure
security of the transferor's right, agricultural users are leery to transfer to
municipal users. 149 According to Thompson, agricultural users believe that urban
areas waste their water allotments by failing to institute growth control and
conservation measures.1 50 He supports his argument when he says that
"metropolitan water institutions may pursue water transfers even when other options
are economically less expensive ... [f]acilitating transfers could remove.., pressure
and thus lead in some cases to less, not more, efficiency.,' 5'1 It is also true that the
marginal cost of transfer may surpass the cost of conservation in certain
instances, creating a legitimate argument for urban pricing and conservation.
152
But with the institution of pricing in large urban coastal areas (i.e., Los Angeles,
San Francisco, etc.) 153 and conservation through the best management practices
from the California Urban Water Conservation Council ("CUWCC"), the
agricultural resistance loses its merit. Pricing is subject to critique, with its issues
of equity and efficiency balancing, as well as actual metering problems. 154 It is
147. HUNDLEY, supra note 1, at 553.
148. Id. at 554.
149. Thompson, supra note 3, at 701-03. Ag-urban transfers are political; institutions are supporting
internal markets, but fewer long-term or interregional transfers and few transfers between smaller users. Id.
150. Id. at 753.
151. Id. at 755.
152. Id. at 757.
153. See W. Michael Hanemann, Designing New Water Rates for Los Angeles, 92 WATER RESOURCES
UPDATE 11 (Summer 1993).
154. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 718.
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important to note that pricing is only one element used to create conservation
incentives in a comprehensive urban water management plan and smart growth
strategies.
Agricultural users are also resistant to municipal transfers given the
likelihood that residential development will establish reliance on the water and
preclude reversion at the end of the transfer period. This concern can be
mitigated with water transfer portfolios for municipal districts. Admittedly, the
districts must have sufficient scale to generate the purchasing power and
sophistication for a portfolio.
The bigger obstacle in transferring, particularly during periods of drought,
appears to be the no-injury rule and the issue of quantifying consumption versus
entitlement (considered "paper water")'55 in California. Thompson acknowledges
that this is a remarkably large administrative (and political) burden for the state
to assume. 56 Transfers are less valuable-or certain-without actual allocation
delivery or riparian quantification, and private contracting does not elude the no-
injury rule.
3. Resistance from Rural Economies; Groundwater Substitution and Third
Party Concerns
The equity concerns over transfers remain an issue, despite legislative
language assuring a weighing of interests when the SWRCB makes its "no-
injury" determinations. More specifically, many rural areas fear exacerbation of
inequitable wealth distribution, third-party economic consequences, and ground-
water overdraft with transfers from areas of origin. 157 Owens Valley left a
psychological scar and, even with area of origin and watershed protection acts for
surface water, many rural counties have asserted as much control as they can
over groundwater. This occurred through groundwater substitution and export
155. Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173 (Ct. App. 2000).
156. Thompson, supra note 3, at 707. Thompson states that:
The only reasonably effective cure for the problems presented by the no-injury rule is to
requantify appropriative rights according to the amount of water that each appropriator can
consume rather than the amount each can divert.... Although transfers would be
unburdened, states would need to calculate the return flows of all water rights immediately in
order to quantify the consumptive rights-a tremendous administrative chore that no state
would want to undertake without a compelling reason.
Id.
157. See generally HANAK, supra note 9, at 42-58; Thompson, supra note 3, at 735. The area of origin
sections were added in 1984. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1215-1222 (West Supp. 2004). They prevent export from a
"protected area" without giving contractual/negotiating priority to the protected area's water users. The county
of origin may also negotiate the appropriation levels. Section 1220 restricts groundwater export from the
Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins without a groundwater management plan and county board of
supervisors' approval. Id. § 1220.
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restriction ordinances after the holding in Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 15 which
confirmed local government authority to regulate groundwater export in 1994.159
V. UNANTICIPATED IMPACTS AND CONTINUED RELEVANCE
Historically, water has followed development.' 60 Moreover, as illustrated by
the Owens Valley and Los Angeles Aqueduct battles, water comes to the more
populated, wealthier sectors of development. 161 Much like the problem with
water project development, built-out coastal areas are pushing growth into more
arid parts of California. But urban growth is correlated with population, and like
squeezed toothpaste, it cannot be returned to the tube--only moved around.
162
Augmented by residential uses with larger lot sizes and landscaping in more arid
climates, urban water demand has correspondingly increased over the past two
and a half decades.
A. Unanticipated Impacts
1. Urban Water Conservation Measures
Corresponding water supply has not met urban water demand through
transfers. Yet, the comparative lack of transfers to urban areas may be an indirect
and unanticipated success, supporting Thompson's metropolitan transferring
inefficiency argument.163 Without transfers, urban areas have been forced to
improve the efficiency of their current water use. Urban water conservation is
now a long-term solution to water supply problems, not simply a stop-gap
measure that occurs during droughts (especially the drought of 1991). 164 Despite
the supporting legislation, this evolution is a logical consequence of the lack of
transfers to urban areas. However, so is a reversal of the water coming to
development precedent, with urban growth moving into areas of ample water
supply. The WTW group was concerned with this scenario should the ag-urban
transfers resistance continue.
65
In the absence of reallocation, the best solution to mitigate the effects of the urban
straw is to modify urban behavior through water conservation.' 66 According to Lee,
158. 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886 (Ct. App. 1994).
159. See HANAK, supra note 9, at 26-27; WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 26.
160. See generally HUNDLEY, supra note 1, at 121-202; see also REISNER, supra note 1, at 5.
161. See generally HUNDLEY, supra note 1, at 144-71; see also Getches, supra note 145, at 535-36.
162. JOHN LANDIS ET AL., GROWTH MANAGEMENT REVISITED: A REASSESSMENT OF ITS EFFICACY,
PRICE EFFECTS AND IMPACTS ON METROPOLITAN GROWTH PATTERNS 9 (Univ. of Cal. Inst. of Urban and Reg'l
Dev., Working Paper 2002).
163. Thompson, supra note 3, at 755.
164. Dickinson, supra note 8, at 1.
165. WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 7-8.
166. WILLIAM E. RIEBSAME, WESTERN LAND USE TRENDS AND POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER
RESOURCES 62-63 (1997).
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as early as 1933, "It]he courts have defined the public interest in terms of the
paramount policy of water conservation."' 67 Again following the drought pattern,
the legislature added showerhead and faucet standards in 1978, then low-flush
toilet standards in 1992.168 Shortly after the 1982 amendment to Water Code
section 109 delegating responsibility for water conservation technical assistance
to DWR and SWRCB, the legislature also imposed standards on water suppliers
in 1983 under the Urban Water Management Planning Act ("UWMPA"). 69 The
UWMPA applies to water agencies with more than 3,000 customers or acre feet
per year and requires them to adopt and submit urban water management plans
(UWMP's) with enumerated elements. 170 These elements include a description of
demand (past, present, and future), ways to meet the demand, a supply reliability
assessment, water conservation measures in place (and reasons for any foregone),
and a water recycling opportunity assessment.
171
1991 was a banner year for urban water conservation. With the drought, the
legislature made two enactments that echoed the Commission's intent. First, it
amended the UWMPA to require estimates of water supplies in the next three
years as well as establish emergency drought plans. 172 Second, it adopted the
Water Recycling Act, which built on the Commission's recommendations by
describing the environmental and societal benefits of water recycling, and set a
minimum threshold for amounts to be recycled in 2000 and 2010.173 Finally, in
1991, water suppliers and the environmental community came together in a
cooperative effort to address a diminishing Bay-Delta. Together, they signed the
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") that effectively extended the pricing
argument from the Final Report.
The MOU was a direct result of the negative reaction to the SWRCB's Draft
Staff Report in the Bay-Delta hearings, calling for capped diversions and urban
water conservation. 174 Virtually every water user opposed the report. 175 Although
the urban water agencies agreed to implement conservation measures, they
balked against the capped diversions, which would force them to bear all of the
shortage uncertainty if conservation measures did not yield the anticipated
savings. 176 The SWRCB backed off and allowed water users to negotiate
conservation measures. The urban water agencies proceeded to align with
environmental interests to implement the conservation practices, generating the
MOU if the SWRCB would shift the skewed burden of risk and entitle uncapped
167. LEE, supra note 18, at 17 (citing Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1933)).
168. See Dickinson, supra note 8, at 6.
169. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10610-10657 (West 1992).
170. Id.
171. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10631-10634 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004).
172. Id. §§ 10620-10621.
173. Id. §§ 13575-13583.
174. Hanemann Interview, supra note 25.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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diversions. 177 While signatures were entirely voluntary, the MOU garnered over
260 signatures from different water agencies and environmental groups, and
generated fourteen best management practices ("BMPs").178
The MOU also established the California Urban Water Conservation Council
("CUWCC"), an extension of the MOU group with a governance system
comprised of an equal number of water districts and environmental groups. Each
agency need only implement the BMPs when they are "cost-effective" for that
agency's system, namely, where costs for conservation do not exceed costs for
purchasing new supply. 179 This principle illustrates Thompson's arguments about
the marginal cost of transfer.' 80 The CUWCC reports on implementation of the
BMPs to the SWRCB, and conducts supporting research and technical assistance
to member agencies. 181 Out of the need for better water conservation and
efficiency, groups that typically competed formed the first consensus agency of
its kind in the United States. 182 Unfortunately, the larger attempt to bring all
players to the table for a greater state water policy through CALFED fell through,
attributed largely to funding troubles.'
83
Like the sluggish transfer market, another urban water conservation measure
has not been as successful in implementation. In 1990, the legislature adopted the
Water Conservation in Landscaping Act (AB 325) to reduce outdoor water
consumption. 84 The legislation mandated that DWR create a Model Landscape
Ordinance by 1993, which local agencies would subsequently adopt or improve
upon, unless they could find that they did not need an ordinance.1 85 A follow-up
statewide implementation review published in March 2001, found that the
legislation had little actual implementation effect, despite its almost universal
adoption in the sample population. 186 The authors attributed the lack of
implementation to institutional issues, insufficiently stringent ordinances, and the
legislation itself, which had few enforcement or pricing requirements.'87 The
review recommended additional research on "the linkages between land use and
water agency policies so that their independent efforts can both be fostered and
integrated to maximize synergy and overall effectiveness.
'' 88
177. Id.
178. Dickinson, supra note 8, at 8.
179. Id. at 11.
180. Thompson, supra note 3, at 757.
181. Dickinson, supra note 8, at 8-9.
182. Id. at 8.
183. See generally Connick, supra note 11, at ch. 6.
184. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65591-65600 (West 1997).
185. Id.
186. ANIL BAMEZAI ET AL., WESTERN POLICY RESEARCH, WATER EFFICIENT LANDSCAPE ORDINANCE
(AB 325): A STATEWIDE IMPLEMENTATION REVtEW 16 (2001).
187. Id. at 16.
188. Id. at 17.
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2. Water Supply and Land Use Planning Linkage
Linkages between land use and water agency policies are increasing through
recent state legislation. According to Hundley, that is how it should be, given
"the powerful reality that Californians are not so much facing a water problem as
a land-use problem."' 89 In Riebsame's 1997 review of western land use trends
and their implications for water policy, the author stated that:
most of the effective action on land use and water in the urban section
focused on landscaping.... Although much is made of current land use
trends and their potential implications for water policy, little attention is
given to land development trends as a source of potential solutions to
problems.' 90
Contemporary research focuses on the increasing connections between land
and water supply planning, with its policy and legal ramifications. 191 Doremus
asserts that the environment, namely, the Endangered Species Act, was the tool
that started linking the different levels of governance with respect to water supply
and land use planning. 92 Specifically, she states, "[w]ater, the essential element
whose limited availability defines the West, is the fulcrum of [the] relationship"
between population growth, endangered species, and water,' 93 However, previous
authors have argued that the link arose through CEQA and NEPA, supported by
the extended controversy and series of suits around the Newhall Land and
Farming Company's Newhall Ranch development in Los Angeles and Ventura
counties. 1
94
The conflation between state and federal environmental laws (like CEQA,
NEPA, CWA, etc.), and water districts' refusals to extend services, influenced
the legislature's grant of water supply responsibility to local governments for
new development. In 1995, EBMUD refused to extend service outside of its
boundaries to the proposed Dougherty Valley development in Contra Costa and
the developer eventually purchased a permanent supply from Kern County.1
95
189. HUNDLEY, supra note 1, at 562.
190. RIEBSAME, supra note 166, at 62-63.
191. See generally id. at Part VI.
192. Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 72 U. COLO. L.
REV. 361,411-14 (2001).
193. ld. at 361.
194. See Kevin M. O'Brien & Barbara Markham, A Tale of Two Coasts: How Two States Link Water
and Land Use Planning, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1996); Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env't v.
County of Los Angeles, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 186 (Ct. App. 2003) (building on Planning & Conservation League v.
Dep't of Water Res., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173 (Ct. App. 2000)).
195. Ryan Waterman, Comment, Addressing California's Uncertain Water Future by Coordinating Long-
Term Land Use and Water Planning: Is a Water Element in the General Plan the Next Step?, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q.
117, 125-28 (2004).
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Following the purchase, the legislature adopted SB 901.196 SB 901 required land
use agencies (cities and counties) to verify water supply for projects that
triggered an EIR and a specific or general plan amendment.' 97 However, this
legislation was cursorily applied, 198 and as a result the legislature adopted SB 610
and SB 221, which went into effect January 1, 2002.199
The legislation links supply assurance to the local planning departments
before permitting on large projects in California. 200 SB 610 strengthens SB 901's
long-term supply assessment during any project subject to CEQA and builds on
the UWMPA by adding groundwater consideration and detailed future supply
assessment, in addition to more severe non-compliance consequences. 20 1 SB 221
establishes a moratorium on development if planners fail to identify a sufficient
water supply for new residential subdivisions before arguing permis.
20 2
Both statutes are riddled with loopholes, including the definition of
"sufficient" water supply, and the fact that they only apply to new projects of 500
units or larger (or, for districts with fewer than 5,000 connections, anything that
would increase use by 10%).203 Established housing is exempt, and arguably,
developers could alter behavior and build new housing up to the 450 or 499 unit
count. But the effect of the flaws in the current legislation may be exaggerated,
according to a recent study showing that the linkage between water and land use
planning exists independently of and even precedes the legislation in some
California cities.2° In their Public Policy Institute of California ("PPIC") survey,
Hanak and Simeti found that "55 percent of all cities and four out of five
counties.., indicated that they have some form of local policy linking
subdivision approval or residential construction-permitting to water supply
conditions" and that any growth, regardless of count, triggered review.20 5 With
the planning and water supply linkages, there is current discussion about adding a
water element to the seven-element general plan requirement.2 6
196. Id. at 129.
197. Id.
198. See Matthew D. Zinn, California's New Water-Supply Planning Statutes: Selected Problems of
Application, 5 CAL. ENVTL. L. REP 123 n.1 (May 2002).
199. See S.B. 610 (enacted as 2001 Cal. Stat. ch. 643) [hereinafter SB 610]; S.B. 221 (enacted as 2001
Cal. Stat. ch. 642) [hereinafter SB 221].
200. Zinn, supra note 198, at 124; SB 221 & SB 610, supra note 199; CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES.,
GUIDEBOOK FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SENATE BILL 610 AND SENATE BILL 221 OF 2001 iv (2003) [hereinafter
DWR GUIDEBOOK].
201. Zinn, supra note 198, at 125-26; SB 221 & SB 610, supra note 199; DWR GUIDEBOOK, supra note
200, at iii.
202. Zinn, supra note 198, at 124.
203. Id. at 127-30; SB 221 & SB 610, supra note 199.
204. ELLEN HANAK & ANTONINA SIMETI, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., WATER SUPPLY AND GROWTH IN
CALIFORNIA: A SURVEY OF CITY AND COUNTY LAND-USE PLANNERS 11-13 (2004).
205. Id.
206. See generally Waterman, supra note 195, at 50-80; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65300-65307 (West 1997
& Supp. 2004).
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Following SB 221 and SB 610 (as well as AB 325), local governments appear to
be the new locus for water supply and land use planning. Although planning and
permitting occur at this level, the decision-making process is loaded with federal,
state, and regional policy and legal overlays. Planners are bound by legal
inconsistencies. They must limit growth if the water supply does not appear to
support additional housing; however, they are obliged to accommodate their fair
share of the region's affordable housing. Despite the shared management in local
planners' actions (through the Endangered Species Act and CEQA reviews),2 °7
Getches expresses concern over granting water policy authority to local agencies.20 8
Granting this authority leads to a singleness in behavior and policy-making,209 and
any new state water policy must incorporate both land use and water policy, as well
as transfers and conservation, to ensure sustainability.
If legislation alone has not achieved a sustainable solution, then institutions must
embrace a comprehensive water and land use policy. Institutions have flexibility to
respond quickly to environmental and climate fluctuations. 210 However, that
flexibility also sustains transfer resistance, potentially creating societal costs that
exceed the savings in transaction costs from internal transfers.211 Water institutions
can "reconfigure water rights to achieve a variety of member goals, including greater
user flexibility, a more efficient or equitable allocation of rights, and the elimination
of entitlement-based externalities. ' 212 If past behavior of tax-base chasing is any
indicator, local planning agencies may not overcome the water institutions'
problems.
Erie and Joassart-Marcelli found water district policy on pricing to be an
influential factor in land-use form and development throughout Southern
California.213 These findings support Getches's concerns over narrow institutional
vision. 214 The authors showed that MWD's pre-1970s water policies of subsidized
pricing to the peripheral suburbs (rather than a fixed rate for handling the water or
actual cost of service charge) came at the expense of the City of Los Angeles. 15
According to the authors, ag-urban transfers further sustain these inequities.216 In
effect, their findings support the idea that pricing can be used as a growth inducing
mechanism when a district is trying to build a service area base.217
207. Doremus, supra note 192, at 414; Getches, supra note 145, at 547.
208. See Getches, supra note 145, at 545-50.
209. Id. at 545-46.
210. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 680.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Steven P. Erie & Pascale Joassart-Marcelli, Unraveling Southern California's Water/Growth
Nexus: Metropolitan Water District Policies and Subsidies for Suburban Development, 1928-1996, 36 CAL. W.
L. REV. 267, 268 (2000).
214. See Getches, supra note 145, at 546.
215. Erie & Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 213, at 280.
216. Id. at 289.
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B. Continued Relevance
1. Evolution of the Transfer Process
The Commission's transfer legislation adopted in 1980 has continued to
evolve, with support from the 821,000 acre-feet of water purchased from the
state's regulated market to the 1991 State Water Bank. 18 California Water Code
sections 1745.02 through 1745.11 were added in 1992 to allow water suppliers to
contract with a state water bank and reduce supplied water for a particular period,
as well as replace transferred water with groundwater.2 19
Wheeling statutes220 provide conveyance mechanisms for the transfer
process. Adopted in 1986, these provisions permit bona fide transferors the use of
conveyance facilities, subject to fair compensation and "no-injury" restrictions,
limitations of the system capacity, and the facility owner's approval.2
Additionally, a public agency must facilitate transfers when they use less than 70
percent of the system's unused capacity.2 22 The court gives deference to the
public agency's determination of capacity.223 In 1987, special legislation
exempted Imperial Irrigation District (I1D) from liability for reduced flow into
the Salton Sea.224 This legislation built on the 1984 version of California Water
Code section 1012, which specifically exempted 1ID from forfeiture of Colorado
225River water for water conservation.22 In response to disputes over the wheeling
legislation, the court in Metropolitan Water District of Southern California v.
Imperial Irrigation District held that a water conveyance owner can charge
uniform wheeling rates (which incorporate system-wide maintenance) if another
user invokes the statute requiring the conveyance owner to allow system use and
there is unutilized conveyance capacity.226
Following the adoption of the code sections placing DWR in charge of
facilitating transfers in 1986,227 the legislature added section 484 in 1991.228
Section 484 permits temporary transfers of water that would have been
consumptively used or stored, without jeopardizing the transferor's right to the
218. WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 4.
219. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1745.02-1745.11 (West Supp. 2004).
220. "Wheeling" means to convey water through another water user's conveyance system. See Metro.
Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 316 (Ct. App. 2000) (defining the term
wheeling and referring to sections 1810 through 1814 of the California Water Code).
221. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1810-1814 (West Supp. 2004).
222. See id. §§ 1813-1814.
223. Id. § 1813.
224. See id. § 1013.
225. See id. § 1012.
226. 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 331 (Ct. App. 2000).
227. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 480-483 (West Supp. 2004).
228. Id. § 484.
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water.229 An extension of the Commission's water conservation intent, sections
1020 through 1030 were added in 1991 to permit water leasing for a period of
five years.230 Lessors (the district or the individual) may lease up to 25 percent of
their conserved water right, provided that they have SWRCB approval and lease
monitoring. 3 In 1992, mutual water companies were permitted to lease as
well .232
Section 1011.5, augmenting section 1011, was added in 1992 to allow
conjunctive use of surface and groundwater and create certainty to appropriators
participating in a conjunctive use program.233 Water banking followed sections
380 through 387, to substantively reflect the Commission's recommendation to
allow local agencies to transfer water outside their district boundaries. 234 Most
recently, in 2003, the legislature adopted AB 514 mandating metering for Central
Valley Project (CVP) contractors, and facilitating the institution of pricing
structures. 235 The statute promotes the Commission's tempered market-based
approach to water management.
2. Water Transfer Workgroup Final Report
But for the Commission's recommendations that established the voluntary
transfer process, the 2002 Water Transfer Workgroup (WTW) Final Report to DWR
would not exist. Their suggestions are an extension of the Commission's Final
Report, revisited, with new and evolving issues related to the market character of the
transfer system. 236 Given the extensiveness of their recommendations, this section
will highlight only a few.
As previously discussed, permit streamlining issues remain.237 The WTW
identified multiple changes in the permit streamlining, from facilitating pre-defined
transfers and environmental reviews, to the inter and intra basin transfer concerns.
Perhaps the strongest recommendation was the argument to establish "shared places
of use for the CVP and SWP 238 to encourage more inter and intra basin transfers.
239
In order to simplify the approval process for the shared places of use, the WTW
proposed limiting approval to those transfers that would result in "[n]o land use
changes .... [n]o growth-industry effects. ... [n]o adverse effects on species or
229. Id.
230. Id. §§ 1020-1030.
231. See id.
232. Id. § 1022.
233. Id. § 1011.5.
234. Id. §§ 380-387.
235. CAL. WATER CODE § 111 (enacted by 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 680).
236. See WTWV FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 11-12. The group recommends looking at the
Commission's Final Report, among other documents, when considering water transfers.
237. See supra Parts Ill.D, IV.A.
238. WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 16.
239. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 719.
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habitats designated in accordance with federal or state endangered species protection
acts. '240 While this is a clever solution, it ties the hands of urban agencies seeking
water for additional growth. Such a recommendation might suggest a bias toward
agricultural uses. However, earlier in the report, the WTW refused to expand the
"injury" definition with respect to water transfers to include "diminishing agricultural
production" because the group is worried that it will be used as a tool to block ag-to-
urban transfers.24'
Furthermore, the WTW addressed the relationship between groundwater and
surface water. This issue exists in a gray jurisdictional separation of two legally
distinct but physically connected water body classifications. With groundwater
substitution and transfers, there is a strong need to protect third parties through
regional groundwater management at the basin level.242 In the section on water
transfers and groundwater banking, the group acknowledged a need for improved
baseline information on the basins themselves, as well as the need for clarification of
the legal ambiguity surrounding rights with aquifer storage. As a solution, the group
recommended using nuisance law, rather than trespass law, to resolve rights disputes
243in varying regions that have different basin characteristics.
One of the most notable concerns in the report has little direct relation to the
Commission's recommendations. The adoption of Water Code section 1707 in 1991
created an issue for surface water transfers, as transferors now fear taking that which
has been conserved or allocated to in-stream use.244 The report suggested statute
clarification, and further defined the policy to "meet nonproject obligations in the
Delta.'
245
Strikingly, many of the issues identified in Lee's 1977 background report on the
transfer issues246 reflect those contained in the WTW's Final Report and in section
1020. Third party effects, permit approval delays, high transaction costs for short-
term transfers, the need for institutional changes outside water rights law, and a
measured but increasing role for regional or local decision-making on transfers,
remain. Ultimately, the state needs a water policy that captures regional market
differences but enjoys immunity from institutional bias.
VI. NEXT STEPS/UNFINISHED BusINEss
In the era of modem California water law, courts have moved towards equity
and the balancing of economic interests. However, this creates uncertainty in the
240. WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 16.
241. See id. at 7.
242. Id. at 56.
243. Id. at 40-41.
244. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West Supp. 2004).
245. WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at v.
246. See CLIFFORD T. LEE, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW,
THE TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (Staff Paper No. 5, Dec. 1977).
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priority system. The Commission intended a balancing approach in the transfer
structure, permitting economic efficiency mitigated by the "no-injury" require-
ments. The Commission's recommendations and subsequent legislation reflect a
systematic approach in the water rights law changes, but have had several obstacles
to transfer implementation.
Expert opinion suggests that California needs a transfer system that can adapt
more regionally. Although "[e]xpanded institutions would also permit greater
regional planning and thereby might help eliminate concerns that urban areas are
placing the entire burden of water conservation on the backs of farmers,"
247
solutions to the water supply questions in California cannot be found in any one
system. The Commission did an excellent job in trying to modernize the statutory
and code systems, but it could not reach institutional bias and urban users'
behavior. Thus, we must identify the remaining transfer impediments in each
248region, agree upon how to prioritize users, and assign responsibility and
mechanisms.
Thompson argues that the Commission's statutory reforms cannot reach the
institutions because there is a delicate balancing occurring between that which can
and should be legislated, and that which should be settled at the local level. He
closes his argument insisting that "[i]n the case of water markets, most legal
thinking to date has also been too abstract... [t]he time has now arrived to turn our
attention to the still highly veiled world of local water institutions. 249 If Dunning's
1977 article is an appropriate gauge, the Commission itself would agree with
250Thompson, arguing for reform generated by an examination of transfer failures.
What emerges from these perspectives is an argument for a consistent reassessment
of the effects of both the abstruse legal theory and the institutional implementation,
much as the Commission conducted in the background research for the Final
Report and economists have been doing since the 1980 transfer legislation.
Hundley would agree, closing with the fact that,
[s]till, there are hopeful signs: the environmental legislation and the
occasional attempts to focus some of the best minds on the issues, most
notably in the 1978 report of the Governor's Commission to Review
California Water Rights Law which, despite then-Governor Jerry Brown's
failure to follow through vigorously on the commission's
recommendations after asking for them, sparked the most effective of
recent reforms.25
247. Thompson, supra note 3, at 753.
248. See id. at 764.
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Once again, we better appreciate the immensity of the hydrologic uncertainty
facing California in the next century. Municipal water districts must foster
creativity when supporting new development with increasingly limited supply
sources. One solution is to develop a water transfer portfolio, allowing districts to
tap the short-term transfer market and adapt to regional differences while
assuaging one of the agricultural community's fears. To reach the other transfer
concern about enabling municipal water waste, urban planners can incorporate
conservation measures into their design review, ordinances, and building codes.
According to the WTW,
[n]ew water development projects, water conservation efforts to reduce
consumptive demand or irrecoverable losses, and water reclamation
programs all need to be pursued if California is to meet the water supply
challenges of a growing population and its environmental and agricultural
needs. Additionally, a more comprehensive discussion of population growth
in California is necessary.252
The latter suggestion is politically controversial, but a vital question for the
legislature and local or regional institutions alike.
Like those trying to site new water projects at the end of the development
era, we must face some of the most difficult and politically unpalatable issues:
undertaking an assessment of water rights in California and considering the
state's population growth. For a successful water market to function relatively
freely, we need to evaluate the certainty in actual deliveries for appropriative
allocations and invest in assigning volumetric figures for riparian rights, given
the increasing state mandates for sufficient supply in permitting new growth.
Planners cannot permit new growth without reliable water entitlements,253
especially as they become more contentious with the advent of anticipated
climate change.254 We honor the Commission's legal legacy of rationality and
reason in politically and socially troubled waters by assuming these issues and
working toward their resolution with comparable acumen and grace.
252. WTW FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 8.
253. See SB 221 & SB 610, supra note 199 and accompanying text (requiring land developers to
identify water supplies for new developments).
254. Johnson & Murphy, supra note 2, § 1, at 1.
